In Iraq Until When?

by Brian Beutler, The Media Consortium: Wed., Jan 23, 2008
Filed under: War Making and Oversight

Close followers of the Iraq mess might remember that on November 28 of last year, President Bush and Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al Maliki signed a statement of intent–called a Declaration of Principles–to “frame the future relationship between the two countries.”

The Declaration itself was vague and unbinding, but it left open the possibility that future negotiations between Washington and Baghdad could result in a commitment of sorts, from the White House to Maliki, that the United States will commit troops to the defense of the Iraqi state from both internal and external threats for years to come.

For instance:

1. Providing security assurances and commitments to the Republic of Iraq to deter foreign aggression against Iraq that violates its sovereignty and integrity of its territories, waters, or airspace.

2. Supporting the Republic of Iraq in its efforts to combat all terrorist groups, at the forefront of which is Al-Qaeda, Saddamists, and all other outlaw groups regardless of affiliation, and destroy their logistical networks and their sources of finance, and defeat and uproot them from Iraq. This support will be provided consistent with mechanisms and arrangements to be established in the bilateral cooperation agreements mentioned herein.

3. Supporting the Republic of Iraq in training, equipping, and arming the Iraqi Security Forces to enable them to protect Iraq and all its peoples, and completing the building of its administrative systems, in accordance with the request of the Iraqi government.

The language here doesn’t necessarily imply a coming commitment of U.S. troops. But, historically, that’s what the term “security commitment” means in the non-binding language of diplomacy. So, what’s the time-frame, then? The Iraqi defense minister, Abdul Qadir has suggested that Iraq won’t be ready to defend itself until 2018. A quick decade or thereabouts.

Of course, only a lame-duck commander-in-chief gone mad would promise the Iraqi government 10 years of military protection (perhaps even from rebel factions within Iraq) during his last year in office. But that just might happen. And that’s where Congress steps in. Today, Rep. William Delahunt (D-Mass.) chaired a joint subcommittee hearing devoted to examining whether such a commitment would be Constitutional without the ratification of a treaty by the U.S. Senate. (A treaty requires a two-thirds vote in the Senate for passage, and would, in this instance, almost surely fail).

That would be the theoretical avenue by which the Congress could block the president from making this sort of agreement with Maliki. But this is the realm of foreign affairs, and as such, words like “legal” and “binding” don’t apply as usual. In absence of a treaty the president could provide similar assurances informally, leaving the future president–Democrat or Republican–in a tricky diplomatic position if he or she decides not to honor Bush’s promise.

Fortunately, there are other constraints. One is time: The Declaration lays out a framework for negotiations that will begin in February with the goal of reaching an agreement of some sort by the end of July. In the meantime, Congress could, for instance, consider legislation floated by Rep. Rosa DeLauro (D-Conn.) which would “require the Bush Administration to consult with Congress before moving forward with any agreement that could lead to long term security arrangements… and makes clear that any such agreement must come in the form of a treaty.”

The other constraints, though, come from within Iraq. On the one hand, those within the Iraqi government who would like a long-term commitment from the United States may not sign on to anything that doesn’t have the force of U.S. law behind it (a treaty, for instance). And on the other hand–according to Iraq expert Kenneth Katzman, who testified at today’s hearing–any agreement of any kind between the U.S. and Iraq would meet “tremendous difficulty passing the Iraqi parliament”. So this is far from a done deal. But it’s also a situation, which, if ignored, could make the Iraq problem even more complicated for the next president than it already promises to be.